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DLD-132 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4627
___________
HIGINIO MENDOZA,
Appellant,
v. 
WILLIAM MEISEL, Brentwood Police Officer; 
GERALD MIKELENIS, Brentwood Police Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00723)
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
February 22, 2008
Before:     BARRY, CHAGARES AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
(Opinion Filed: March 19, 2008)
       On May 24, 2007, Mendoza was ticketed for “driving while operating privilege is1
suspended or revoked” in violation of 75 Pa. C. S. § 1543.  At that time he signed an
acknowledgment that his license had been surrendered as a result of a prior suspension. 
Appellant apparently has a history of driving while his driver’s license is suspended,
dating back to at least February 5, 1998.  See Mendoza v. Larotonda, 2:07cv210, Doc.
No. 1-2 at p.4  
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_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Higinio Mendoza, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint for failure to state a
claim.  For the following reasons, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B).
This case arises from several motor vehicle convictions entered against the
Appellant which he alleges were the result of harassment, racial profiling and retaliation
by the Brentwood Police Department.  Mendoza filed a complaint seeking damages to
compensate for loss of employment due to the suspension of his driving privileges, in
alleged violation of his equal protection and due process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983.  He further requests that his driver’s license be returned to him and that his driving
suspension and traffic citations be overturned.  Mendoza also requests a hearing in federal
district court to establish that his due process rights have been abridged as the result of his
convictions for traffic offenses.   He claims that unidentified court transcripts and audio1
       The Court conducted a two-step analysis to determine whether to direct service of2
the complaint, because Mendoza sought to proceed in forma pauperis.  See Roman v.
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990).  The Court found Mendoza to be without
sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee and granted him leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. 
3
and visual materials support his view that the series of tickets he received constitute
evidence of racial profiling and that these materials will demonstrate “the pattern/s, or
discrepancies, and inaccuracies that took place.”  
The District Court dismissed Mendoza’s case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).2
The District Court reasoned that Mendoza is barred from asserting a § 1983 claim until
the convictions on his challenged motor vehicle offenses are set aside or have otherwise
terminated in his favor.  See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994) (§ 1983
damages actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding
criminal judgments that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his
conviction or confinement).  Mendoza filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   We exercise plenary review over a dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), see, e.g., Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir.
2000), and conclude that Mendoza’s appeal fails because it is “indisputably meritless.” 
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). 
We disagree with the District Court that Heck applies to a case such as Mendoza’s. 
Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim where the plaintiff is unable to challenge his conditions
of confinement through a petition for federal habeas corpus.  Leather v. Eyck, 180 F.3d
4420, 424 (2d Cir. 1999).  Because Mendoza was never incarcerated, or otherwise in
custody, federal habeas relief has never been available to him and, therefore, Heck cannot
apply.  Id.  However, we may affirm the District Court on any ground supported by the
record.  See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Mendoza has failed to state a claim that contains even an arguable basis in law for
violations of either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause against either
defendant.  “[T]o sustain a § 1983 claim based upon a violation of procedural due process
[a plaintiff] must, at a minimum, prove recklessness or ‘gross negligence’ and in some
instance may be required to show a ‘deliberate decision to deprive’ the plaintiff of due
process.”  Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1277 (3d Cir.
1994), citing Daniels v. William, 474 U.S. 327, 333-34 (1986).  Mendoza has not alleged
any facts to support an intentional or reckless deprivation of due process.  However, even
if he did and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had no legal basis for suspending his
license, Mendoza had various remedies that he could have pursued to retrieve his license,
including an application for reinstatement.  “[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of
property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful
postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.”  Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533
(1984); see also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of a driver’s license
implicates a protectible property interest).  Moreover, Mendoza does not claim to have
5been denied a hearing to challenge the suspension of his license; rather, he alleges that the
loss of his license caused him economic hardship.  Such an allegation is not sufficient to
constitute a Due Process violation.  The Due Process Clause is satisfied if, “when a State
seeks to terminate an interest such as [an individual’s drivers’ license and registration],” it
affords “‘notice and opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case’
before the termination becomes effective.”  Bell, 402 U.S. at 542.  Mendoza does not
allege he was denied such an opportunity.  
Mendoza also fails to allege or provide any evidence that he was treated differently
from other people who are similarly situated, which is necessary to state an equal
protection claim.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985); Keenan v. City of Phila., 983 F.2d 459, 465 (3d Cir. 1992).  Accordingly, his
equal protection claim must also be dismissed. 
Mendoza’s retaliation claim likewise lacks merit.  Retaliation for the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights is itself a constitutional violation.  White v. Napoleon,
897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25
(3d Cir. 2000) (“[G]overnment actions, which standing alone do not violate the
Constitution, may nonetheless be constitutional torts if motivated in substantial part by a
desire to punish an individual for exercise of a constitutional right.”).  However, Mendoza
has failed to allege facts demonstrating a causal link between his constitutionally
protected conduct of filing a lawsuit, and the traffic citation he received on May 24, 2007. 
6For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the appeal is meritless and we will dismiss
it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
 
